It is time to treat the rare earthly as power. China already does it

In April 2025, China imposed a new export of control over seven rare earth elements and the constant magnets obtained by them – materials that form the basis of modern life and modern war. Fighters, rocketsElectric vehicles, drones, wind turbines and even data centers rely on highly efficient magnets made of these critical minerals. By limiting their flow, Beijing not only bends its industrial muscle, he revealed that America and the rest of the dangerous vulnerability of the world. China’s last actions They show their readiness and ability to arm American and global dependence.

This is not a new challenge. The United States has known for more than 15 years that its critical mineral supply chains are too concentrated, too fragile and too much exposed to a Chinese lever and control. Nevertheless, in democratic and republican administrations, we were unable to respond urgently or consistency. Now the consequences of these failures have grabbed us by the neck and cascades us in our commercial and defense sector.

Following the negotiations in London, Washington and Beijing announced on Friday New commercial framework China will resume approval of export licenses for rare lands over the next six months. US officials publicly praised a breakthrough – but they offered some details about what was given in return. This leaves big questions unanswered: what were the American compromises? How will the deal be attached? And what happens when the six months got up?

Skepticism is high. Ford recently stopped production at its Chicago factory due to a lack of magnet-emphasizing that even short-term supply interruptions have real consequences. Paper agreements are not a supply chain solutions. Without transparency, timely approval and long -term planning, this can easily become another diplomatic cycle one step forward, two steps back.

Even this limited recovery carries risks. Dozens of companies in Europe and North America have described Chinese licensing process as a highly invasive -Certification of companies to provide detailed production data, final use applications, facility images, customer names and transaction history. Some candidates have been denied that they do not provide photos or documentation to their end users.

Managers say that the process is “official retrieval of information”.

While companies are advised not to share a sensitive IP, missing key details can mean delays in vanity. For companies in defense supply chains, the consequences are anxious: valuable commercial intelligence can be used to map competitors, pricing or progress of Chinese substitutes.

This is not just licensing – it’s competitive observation. And until the US does not build a secure, independent capacity in the critical mineral supply chain, it remains exposed to both interruption and data risk.

This vulnerability did not happen overnight. Many have been watching this train spoile with slow movement for years. In 2010, China interrupted the export of rarely Earth to Japan during a maritime dispute, a clear warning shot dead to monitor the United States, but washed away. In 2014, the Obama administration won a WTO case against China’s export restrictions, but mistakenly accepted that legitimate success would discourage more manipulation.

What did Trump do, biden

The first Trump administration described the rare lands as critical, but significantly released them from the rates for China 2018, perhaps unspoken recognition of US addiction. Biden uses the most structured approach so far: executive order 14017, the critical working group for minerals and funding from IIJA and IRA. Strategic partnerships have emerged such as the mineral security partnership. But progress was slow, hindered by resolving delays and uneven commitments.

The Second Trump Administration returned with more aggressive measures, citing section 232, activating the Law on Defense Production and offering major increases in FY2026. The National Energy Domination Council is now coordinating efforts. Still, these measures, like China’s six -month recovery, still do not respond to Beijing’s grip. And most importantly, the sector of the defense remains cut off without such a licensing window.

The recent G7 summit in Canada emphasized global bets. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen directly accuse China of “arms” of its control Over key materials such as rare lands, calling for a united response to the G7. The result: a G7 Critical Mineral Action PlanS Although China was not mentioned by name, the subtext was unmistakable. The plan engages G7 members to raise ESG standards and track key resources; mobilization of capital for new projects in critical mineral production and processing; And to cooperate with the innovation in recycling, replacing and improving technology.

Alone, Beijing reacts with rage. The Chinese Foreign Ministry rejected the plan as a “pretext” for protectionism, claiming that the G7 was inciting confrontation for fear of losing a market share.

Brussels now signals that trade negotiations with Beijing are effective in stagnation, so the chances of revenge for the Chinese – especially against the EU – are increasing. If China doubles, it risks pressing the EU, Japan, South Korea and India in Washington’s orbit – exactly what Beijing hopes to avoid.

China’s dominant position in the extraction of rare land

Raw numbers are stunning. China represents approximately 70% of the global production of rare land, but over 90% of the refining capacity. It produces 92% of the world magnets of Neodymo-Zhex (NDFEB)-used in everything-from submarines to Teslas. This domination is no accident. Chinese subsidized processing focused on global supply chain, and scale production much faster than the West can approve and issue permits for a mine.

Us sites like MP materials“The mountain passage and a circular top remain incomplete without processing down the chain. DOD and DOE offer grants, and the Trump FY2026 budget seems to expand the US mining capacity and provide access to critical minerals. But all this remains a dwarf from the main start of China and the long -standing industrial industrial command.

China passed early and decisively to Africa and Latin America, partnering with governments in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bolivia and Chile; Investing in ports, rails and refining of infrastructure. In contrast, US efforts and commitment to these sets of questions are partial and values ​​forward, prioritize transparency and management, really important issues, but providing limited inertia of critical mineral problems. Even his recent with Ukraine and Democratic Republic of Congo, so far, they remain symbolic, impeded by conflict and instability in these countries.

London negotiations and recent commercial transaction have bought time. But time without a strategy is not fruitful. The Chinese licensing regime remains intact, its data requires continuously. The defense sector remains off. Meanwhile, threats in the congress to cancel the financing of clean energy and industrial policy can retain projects on the rare land, just when they acquire grip.

This is a decisive moment. China relies that the internal divisions of America – between labor, industry, environmentalists, tribal nations and political factions – will prevent the type of combined, sustainable efforts needed for the competition. They may be right. The US must prove them wrong.

Critical minerals are geopolitical power

The United States now must treat critical minerals not as goods, but as tools for geopolitical power. China is already doing it. The escape of his grip will require more than the licenses for the mine and the short -term funding. It requires an agreed, long -term strategy for building a full chain of supply that includes not only internal capabilities but also reliable allies and partners. From mining and refining to the production and recycling of a magnet, each connection must be strengthened through purposeful investment, allowing reform and strategic coordination.

A successful and sustainable policy requires commitment from one presidency to the next. Neither the US cannot afford to engage only allies and partners. Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chile and Indonesia (by the way) need long -term partnerships supported by financing, technology transfer and investment in critical infrastructure, not just our management lectures.

The six-month exported exported from China is not a solution-it is a stress test. He reveals whether the US can finally focus and act or whether they will retire again. Beijing bets to be the last. Washington must respond with urgency, unity and strategy equal to the scale of the challenge. There is still time, but not much.

–From DWARDRIC MCNEALManaging Director and Senior Policy Analyst at Longview Global and CNBC Assistant