How funded with Russian counterfeit news is intended to break the European elections

The secret Russian funded network is trying to violate the upcoming democratic elections in the Eastern European country, the BBC has found.

Using an undercover reporter, we found that the network promised to pay the participants if they published pro-Russian propaganda and fake news that undermined Moldova’s ruling party for Pro-EU before the parliamentary vote on September 28.

Participants were paid to find supporters of Moldova’s pro-Russian opposition to enroll in secret and to perform the so-called poll. This was done in the name of a non -existent organization that makes it illegal. The results of this selective sample, the organizer of the proposed network, can raise the foundations to question the result of the election.

The results of the so -called poll, which suggests that the ruling party will lose, have already been published online.

In fact, official polls suggest that the ruling party of actions and solidarity (PAS), founded by President Maya Sandu, is currently ahead of the pro -Russian patriotic electoral block (BPP).

We have found connections between the secret network and the Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shore – sanctioned by the United States for “Operations for the Kremlin’s Malicious Impact,” and now a fugitive in Moscow. The United Kingdom also sanctions it for corruption.

We also found links between the network and a non -profit organization (NGO) called evasia.

Evasia has ties to G -N Shore and has been sanctioned by the United Kingdom, the United States and the EU for claiming to bribe Moldova citizens to vote against EU membership last year. The referendum of joining, traveled, But with a very small marginS

“In 2024, the focus of the campaign (Ilan Shor) was money. This year, the focus is misinformation,” Moldova’s BBC World Service told the BBC World Service.

We asked Ilan Shore and Evasia to answer our investigation findings – they did not answer.

• If you are in the UK, you can watch the history of Global Eye, BBC 2 at 19:00 BST on Monday, September 22, September 22

Moldova may be small, but it is stuck between Ukraine and the EU Romania in the EU, it is strategic for both Europe and the Kremlin, experts say.

The world service has penetrated the network – coordinated in the Telegram messaging application – through a connection sent to us by a whistle.

This gave us a decisive idea of ​​how the anti -democratic propaganda network works.

Our Undercover Reporter Ana and 34 other recruits were asked to attend secret online seminars that would “prepare operatives”. With titles like “How to move from your kitchen to a national leader,” they seem to serve as a process of verification. Anna and the others had to go through regular tests for what has been learned.

Our reporter then contacted a network coordinator called Alina Juk. The profile of Social Media of G -Ja Juc says it is from the transnestry, the separatist region of Eastern Moldova, loyal to Moscow, and its Instagram shows that it has made many trips to Russia in the last few years.

Mrs. JUC told Ana that 3,000 Moldovan Lei ($ 170, 125 British pounds) would be paid a month to produce Tiktok and Facebook publications on the eve of the election and that it would be sent by Promsvyazbank (PSB)-a commonly based Russian government.

Anna and other recruits were trained to produce social media publications using Chatgpt. The content “attracts people if the picture contains a satire … above reality”, they were told, but this should be avoided too much AI to ensure that the publications feel “organic”.

Inside the Telegram, Ana and BBC group, they had access to previous instructions issued to participants. Initially, they were asked for patriotic posts for historical figures in Moldova’s history – but gradually demands became frankly politically.

Anna was asked to publish unfounded allegations – including that the current Moldova government plans to falsify elections results, the potential EU membership of Moldova depends on its citizens to become LGBTQ+and that President Sano facilitates child trafficking.

Social media campaigns are often central to national elections. We have observed social media publications in support of Moldova’s ruling party, but did not reveal an obvious misinformation campaign.

During our undercover exercise with the network, we only shared publications that were actually accurate and restricted their number.

We wanted to find out who was on the network, as we had evidence that it was made up of numerous groups similar to those we had penetrated. We have sought models of similar activity in other accounts that we could observe by access to our telegram.

The network, we have locked, is made up of at least 90 Tiktok accounts – some masked as news editions – which publish thousands of videos for a total value of over 23 million views and 860,000 likes since January. Moldova’s population is only 2.4 million.

We have shared our discoveries with a US-based digital forensic laboratory (DFRLAB) and told us that its analysis shows that the network may be even greater. The broader network has accumulated over 55 million views and over 2.2 million Tiktok likes since January, DFRLAB discovered.

The network not only publishes misinformation. Ju Juc also offered the Anaa 200 moldovan Lei (12, £ 9) per hour to conduct unofficial surveys, interviewing people in Moldova’s capital on their preferred election candidates.

Before performing this task, participants are trained how to swing on those who are surveying.

They were also asked to secretly glue the respondents, who said they supported the pro -Russian opposition.

Ju Juc revealed that this is “to prevent falsification of the vote”, which suggests the results of the study and secret records will be used in the event of a PAS victory as supposed evidence that it won unfairly.

Our evidence also suggests that the network that the reporter who joined Russia has joined. Anna hears – and filmed – Alina Juk on the phone asking for money from Moscow.

“Listen, can you bring money from Moscow … I just have to give my people my salaries,” we shot it, saying.

It was not clear who would send her the money, but we found connections between the network and Ilan Shore through NGO Evasia.

Ilan Schor and Evasia did not respond to our investigation findings.

The BBC find pictures of the leader of Anna, Alina Juk, on the Evasia website – and one of the Telegram groups Anna was added, was called “evasia leaders”.

The United Kingdom’s Foreign Office says Evasia operates “in Moldova on behalf of corrupt fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor … to destabilize the Moldovan democracy.”

We asked Alina Juk to comment on our discoveries – she didn’t answer.

Tiktok said it has implemented additional safety and security measures before the election and continues to “aggressively counteract fraudulent behavior”. The owner of Facebook Meta did not respond to our discoveries.

The Russian Embassy in the United Kingdom denied participation in counterfeit news and election interventions and claims that the EU was hindering Moldova’s choice.

Additional reporting: Malvina Cojocari, Andreea Jitaru, Angela Stanceu