Israeli military published the first report on 7 October 2023.

The Israeli military published their first official story about the mistakes that led to his failures during the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, which caused the war in Gaza.

The report concludes that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) “failed to defend Israeli civilians in their mission.”

The 19 -page report contains a lot, which is already known about what has led to a catastrophic loss of about 1,200 lives, when approximately 5,000 Hamas artilizers and other Palestinian groups invade Israel, also taking 251 hostages in the process.

There are no dramatic revelations, but it is still sobering to see the military’s conclusions about how Hamas’s intentions misjudged and underestimated his capabilities, exposed in black and white.

The report states that the military views gas as a secondary threat to security, with a priority given to Iran and Hezbollah. According to him, his policy was “paradoxical: Hamas was illegitimate, but there was still no effort to develop an alternative.”

The military had chosen an approach for “conflict management” to deal with gas, writes. And he had suggested that Hamas was not interested (c), nor was he preparing for a large -scale war ” – a perception, reinforced by Hamas’s own tactics.

The evidence of 2018 suggests that Hamas – which is prescribed as a terrorist group from Israel, the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries – are indeed developing an ambitious plan, are interpreted as “unrealistic or impossible”, reflecting “Hamas’s long -term aspirations, not as a threat.”

The report says that in the months leading to the war, the Military Intelligence Directorate began to develop a new assessment, suggesting that the Hamas plan was not just a vision, but a “specific operational planning frame”.

However, this evaluation was not focused on the attention of senior military intelligence officials.

The report identifies a wide series of complacency within the military for Hamas’s intentions and how to deal with the threat it represented.

“There was no deep discussion of the question: What if we are wrong?” says in the report.

Over time, a significant and continuous gap between Hamas’s intelligence and reality developed.

The report also emphasizes what it writes is “a decline in deep acquaintance with the different worldview of the enemy, including his culture, religion, language and history.”

He calls for a deep reform of the Culture of the Intelligence Directorate, “Encourage intellectual openness, skepticism, listening, learning, debate and constructive disagreement.”

It states that the desire to protect the highly valuable sources of intelligence have contributed to the failure of the military to increase the level of warning immediately before October 7.

According to him, the Gaza Division “was effectively defeated for a few hours” on October 7, significantly violating its ability to understand what is happening and react effectively.

It says the Air Force reacted quickly, but “there were significant difficulties between the troops, civilians and terrorists of IDF.”

The report also said that in some incidents, wounded soldiers were evacuated to civilians.

After submitting the commanders’ findings on Monday, leaving IDF headquarters, Lt Gen Herzi Halevi, said he had taken full responsibility for failures.

“I hug my responsibility. This is mine. I was the army commander on October 7 and I have my responsibility and I have all your responsibility. I see that as mine too. And I see that in every myy command that went wrong, there is part of me,” he said in the video.

Last month, the general announced his resignation on failures and called for an investigation of a committee to carry out a broader investigation to help prevent another attack.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who acknowledged no responsibility for what happened on October 7, said such a state investigation should wait until the end of the war.

His critics accuse him of not wanting to acknowledge any personal guilt.

Israel responded to the attack on October 7, launching a campaign for the air and ground in Gaza, during which at least 48 365 people were killed, according to the Hamas Health Ministry.